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neighboring landlocked Ethiopia. The model shows that redistributing some of the resources 
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1. Introduction 
  Somaliland is a former British protectorate, on the southern shore of the Gulf of Aden, 
which seceded unilaterally from Somalia in 1991, after three decades of unsuccessful attempt 
at creating a unified country with the latter. Its population is estimated at about 3.5 million 
people. It has two main kinds of physical assets: its pastoral assets of grazing land and 
livestock, on the one hand, and its transport infrastructures, on the other hand. The latter 
include mainly the port of Berbera, and to a lesser extent the airport of Hargeysa, its capital 
city, as well as their connecting roads. The nomadic herdsmen need the port of Berbera for 
exporting their livestock to the Arabian Peninsula and other neighboring countries in the 
Middle East, which provide their main outlet. Moreover, Berbera is ideally located to give a 
convenient access to the Indian Ocean to neighboring landlocked Ethiopia, and there is a main 
road between the two
1. Berbera’s traffic has been rising steadily over the last decade. For 
example its traffic of import containers has nearly doubled between 2003 and 2007 (MNPC, 
2010). This port’s promising position is confirmed by the fact that Bolloré Africa Logistics, 
the biggest port operator in Africa, has recently made public its project of investing massively 
in Berbera’s port and its transport corridor with the Ethiopian capital-city Addis Abbeba
2.  
The Ogaden province across the border in Ethiopia is also peopled by Somali-speaking 
herdsmen, and that border is traditionally fairly porous, as might be expected in a land mostly 
devoted to nomadic pastoral activity. Refugees have crossed this border back and forth over 
the last decades, depending on the changing intensity of fighting during the Ethiopian civil 
war, which ended in 1991, and the one in Somalia ever since. The best grazing land called the 
Haud is straddling this border that nomadic herdsmen are also routinely crossing
3. While 
ethnically homogenous, these Somali-speaking people of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia 
                                                 
1 Markakis (1992) provides a regional perspective on the ports in the Horn of Africa. 
2  WorldCargo News online, March 15, 2010. “Bolloré proposes Berbera-Adis Ababa Transport Corridor”. 
www.worldcargonews.com (accessed July 2, 2010, reproduced from Medeschi, December 10, 2009). 
3 See map 6.1, p.101 in Doornbos, 1993.   2
and Somaliland are traditionally affiliated to different clans that straddle these countries’ 
borders, which might at times enter into violent conflict against one another. The chaos that 
prevails in most of Somalia, which is engulfed in warlordism and banditry ever since the 
collapse of the state in 1991, testifies that the threat of violence is looming large over this 
people. The military government led by Siyad Barre had launched an unsuccessful invasion of 
the Ogaden region in neighboring Ethiopia in 1978 and eventually signed a peace agreement 
with the Mengistu regime in 1988, which was perceived as a disgrace by many Somalians. 
Many military officers from the north, mainly from the Isaaq clan, which is the largest one in 
Somaliland, accused Siyad Barre of having mishandled the operations. They felt that the 
conquest of a more limited area in the Ogaden, including mainly the grazing land used by the 
Isaaq clan, could have been a success. This peace agreement with Ethiopia triggered a full-
blown civil war in Somalia, as many clans wanted to hang on to the pan-Somali project, 
which resulted in a coup d’état that toppled the military regime in 1991. Then chaos ensued, 
and Somalia collapsed into a stateless entity, dominated by banditry and warlordism. 
Nevertheless, in nearly two decades since Somaliland seceded from Somalia, it has managed 
to develop the port of Berbera and to enforce an acceptable level of security on the paved road 
linking it to Ethiopia for the traders to adopt this route. A large share of Ethiopia’s 
international trade is now shipped via this port. This achievement stands in sharp contrast to 
the rest of Somalia, where the civil war has brought chaos, leaving the land under the violent 
domination of warlords and bandits.  
The aim of this paper is to present a framework for thinking about this unexpected 
success and to draw some lessons for understanding state formation in general. A very simple 
model is presented that brings out how the political equilibrium that emerged in Somaliland is 
fundamentally rooted in the need to provide security to the traders who provide most of 
Berbera’s activity. This is a sine qua non for the traffic through Berbera to be active and   3
flourishing. This model sheds some light on the fairly unusual political institutions that 
emerged from less than two decades of self rule by Somaliland, following the secession. 
Although some limited fighting occurred for a while inside Somaliland in the early 1990s, in 
particular over the control of the port of Berbera and the airport of Hargeysa, the 
Somalilanders engaged quickly in a political process that led to a fairly successful democracy 
in about a decade
4. What seems very important when looking at the experience of Somaliland 
is that this gradual build-up of a functioning state started from the grassroots, with very little 
outside interference. Eubank (2010) emphasizes that the “Somaliland Republic” has not been 
recognized internationally, what makes it ineligible for foreign aid. In his view, this is an asset 
rather than a liability, as it forced the Somalilanders to develop accountable political 
institutions and to engage in state formation in a non-Eurocentric fashion. The aim of the 
present paper is to go one step further in analyzing the type of government that resulted, and 
in particular to explain clearly why Eubank (2010) does not find in Somaliland the “fiscal 
decentralization” that he is looking for. The model argues instead that the redistribution of 
fiscal resources from the government to the different regions lies at the heart of these peaceful 
and democratic institutions. The key role of redistribution in peaceful state-building in Africa 
has been emphasized before, in particular by Azam (2006). In Somaliland, this redistribution 
of fiscal resources has mainly funded a significant expansion in the education sector in all 
regions of the country, as well as some expansion of the health sector. Between 1997 and 
2006, the number of primary schools has risen from 165 to 516, while the number of 
                                                 
4 A constitutional referendum took place on May 31, 2001. Then, district council elections took place in 
December 2002, Presidential elections in April 2003, and parliamentary elections in September 2005 (Bradbury, 
2008). A new presidential election took place in June 2010, about two years behind schedule (Brumfield, Ben, 
and Mohamed Amiin Adow. 2010. “Polarized Somalia Marks 50 Years of Freedom from Colonial Rule.” 
www.CNN.com, June 26, 2010 (accessed June 27, 2010)). In the meantime, the main political parties were 
grappling with the conceptually demanding issue of defining a correct voter registration list in a country where 
nomadic herdsmen are wandering all over the place and often crossing the borders with neighboring countries in 
search of pasture. A compromise was found eventually without any violence, thanks to the strong involvement of 
the clans’ elders in the debate (see below). The incumbent lost to the opposition leader (Adow, Mohamed Amiin. 
2010. “Opposition leader wins elections in Somaliland.” www.CNN.com, July 3, 2010 (accessed same day).   4
Universities has risen from 1 to 5 (MNPC, 2010). Eubank (2010) presents some plots showing 
the remarkable progress of school enrolment over a decade. 
The model presented below argues that the “Somaliland Republic” shares many 
features of the “Indirect Rule” system that was widely used in the days of the British Empire, 
and that has been used in many developing countries since their independence. In particular, 
Boone (2003) shows how this system was applied quite successfully in several parts of post-
colonial Francophone West Africa, where the central government delegated the task of 
controlling some areas to some local traditional authorities, in return for some transfers. We 
argue below that this system cuts through a vexing “bootstrap” problem that faces all new 
states: you need to have fiscal resources to extend the control of the state to various parts of 
your territory, but you need to have a fairly serious level of control to be able to raise those 
fiscal resources in the first place. This problem explains to a large extent why many African 
states exert in fact an extremely limited effective control over their territory, leaving de facto 
large parts of their country without any effective state presence, as emphasized by Herbst 
(2000). We argue that Somaliland was put on the fast track to solve this problem thanks to 
two of its pre-existing assets. First, this country inherited a valuable transport infrastructure, 
which only required establishing an efficient political regime to become competitive in the 
Horn of Africa. We suggest that “ports are the taxman’s best friend” in what follows, as they 
provide a “choke-point” where taxable resources get concentrated and make revenue 
collection relatively cheap. Second, the traditional institutions of this nomadic pastoral society 
had not been destroyed by either the British colonial rule, or the subsequent “modernizer” 
national government of post-colonial Somalia, despite the brutal attacks by Mogadishu’s 
government in the final years of Siyad Barre’s rule in the late 1980s (Lewis, 2008). That 
indiscriminate violence against civilians and soldiers alike probably helped the Somalilanders 
to achieve a consensus on the project to secede from Somalia and build a state of their own.   5
The Somali nomadic herdsmen are still strongly affiliated to different clans, themselves 
subdivided into kinship groups, which are subject quite informally but firmly to the leadership 
of the elders. There is no real “chiefdom” among the Somali, unlike in many other African 
societies (Lewis, 2008), but the elders exert a significant level of authority.  
The power thus exerted by the elders over their kinship group was successfully 
harnessed to the emerging “Somaliland Republic” by creating a House of the Elders, called 
Gurti in Somali, beside a more standard elected House of Representatives. This upper house 
is playing in Somaliland’s bicameral system a part close to that played by the House of Lords 
in Britain’s Westminster system, allowing the traditional authorities to be involved directly in 
running the country’s affairs. We argue below that this is one of the fundamental pillars of 
this country, as this is the key to establishing at a low upfront cost the required level of 
security for making the port of Berbera an economic success, and hence, a reliable source of 
fiscal revenues. The newly emerging Somalilander government is in fact delegating to the 
elders the task of controlling violence and banditry, with a view to protect the traders who 
then pay taxes in return for the transport services of Somaliland and its port. Then, the 
redistribution of fiscal revenues pointed out by Eubank (2010), as mentioned above, is the 
natural compensation for the investment made by the elders in providing the key public good 
that makes this lucrative trade possible. Hence, our approach to Somaliland’s state-building 
shares some features of the so-called “property rights” approach to the theory of the firm 
(Hart, 1995). The returns to the transport infrastructure inherited by Somaliland thus depend 
crucially on the “relationship-specific investments” (Hart, 1995) made by the elders in 
controlling violence and banditry, which is in turn rewarded by some redistribution of fiscal 
revenues. Similarly, Hart’s theory rests on “incomplete contracts theory”, which assumes that 
only a fraction of the observable information can be used as part of an enforceable contract, 
while the rest is not verifiable by a court, although it is observable by the parties to the   6
contract. Our model pushes this to the extreme, as there is no third party that can be called 
upon to enforce any agreement between the government and the clans’ elders.  
The solution offered here to this fundamental commitment problem brings out the key 
theoretical contribution made by the present model relative to Alesina and Spolaore’s theory 
of the size of nations (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). The latter defines the government as a 
country’s monopoly producer of a public good that benefits its people differentially. They 
then raise serious doubts about the possibility of compensating people for these differential 
benefits by transfers, because of the lack of commitment of the democratic government that 
they assume. In the present model, the government is unable to produce the public good 
alone, and must rely on the traditional authorities that are in a position to control violence and 
banditry, provided their participation constraint is satisfied through a transfer. Then, the 
promise of this transfer can be made credible in a repeated-game framework because the 
recipients can punish any deviation by the government by reducing drastically its payoff in 
case of cheating. This implicit threat is credible because the recipient of the transfer is 
incurring a positive opportunity cost in delivering its part of the deal. Hence, what looks like a 
transfer is in fact the price paid for a productive service sold to the government. 
The resulting political structure can thus be viewed as a variant of the hybrid 
institutional structures analyzed in Bendor and Mookherjee (1987), which combine local 
hierarchies with various forms of decentralization. The social control exerted by the elders in 
Somaliland is a form of hierarchical relationship within the clan, while the assembly of the 
elders provides a more horizontal form of cooperation between the clans. Hence, the political 
organization prevailing in Somaliland is a form of non-territorial federation of clans that 
accommodates the special constraints facing a nation of nomadic herdsmen. Moreover, the 
experience of Somaliland analyzed below suggests that a key part is played by the 
redistribution of the gains from cooperation by transfers, a possibility that is not explored in   7
the Bendor-Mookherjee paper. We suggest below that the original political organization 
adopted in Somaliland makes this possible by helping the key players to share the required 
information in a credible fashion. 
More generally, the state-formation theory sketched below views the state as a means 
to internalize some key externality that has the potential to enlarge the opportunity set of the 
players, provided a fair compensation is paid to the investors. This is why redistribution plays 
such a key role in African state building, as mentioned above. The reason for this result is that 
the basic negative externality that plagues African states is the threat of civil war, or more 
generally the threat of violence. If I get armed, then your expected welfare goes down, as 
there is a non-zero probability that I will use these weapons to attack you or to damage your 
assets. This is what the “social contract” aims at preventing, by providing a fair and credible 
compensation for giving up one’s weapons (Azam and Mesnard, 2003). In Somaliland, the 
threat was more directed at the economy, as any insecurity felt by the traders would have 
brought the port of Berbera to a halt. Nevertheless, this implicit threat was overcome through 
a gradual bottom-up process leading to the emergence of the democratic regime.  
Section 2 presents the basic model, while section 3 describes the basic mechanisms 
that sustain the efficient political equilibrium of this model. Section 4 brings out the key 
differences explaining why a similar process did not take place elsewhere in Somalia. Section 
5 offers some brief conclusions. 
 
2. A Model of Traders under Threat 
  After the breakup of Somalia, law and order collapsed, and the country became prey to 
roving bandits and warlords, making trade highly risky. However, Somaliland itself managed 
to isolate a relative safe heaven for traders. The following model aims at bringing out the two 
levels of political organization that made this possible. We first analyze how the traditional 
system of social control was mobilized for reining in uncontrolled violence. The next section   8
will bring out how a higher level of political cooperation was needed to create the required 
level of security for making Berbera a success. 
  The Traders 
  We choose a very simple model for capturing the key part played by security in 
determining the level of trade going through Somaliland and Berbera. Let x be the value of 
the goods transported through the country by the traders. The latter potentially incur three 
types of costs while moving across the country: (i) there is first a resource cost involved in 
trucking the shipments, including fuel, labor, etc. (ii) then, they might be raided by bandits 
along the way. In this case, we assume that the bandits take everything away from the trader, 
leaving him without anything to sell at the port, and we denote π  the probability that this 
happens. (iii) Lastly, for the lucky ones who have not been raided, we assume that they have 
to pay a tax when leaving the country at the fixed rate t. On the export side, we thus assume 
that the tax is paid at the port, and on the import side, at the end of the trip, i.e. mainly at the 
border for the transit trade to Ethiopia
5. Then, assume that the government holds a tight 
control over corruption so that the tax rate is fixed before the other agents make their 
decisions, and does not respond to the observed trade flow coming through its control points. 
All the parameters of the model are assumed to be common knowledge, so that all the players 
can correctly anticipate the decisions made later on by the other players. The traders are 
assumed to play last, i.e., to make their decision to start the trip or not while taking t and π  
as given. 
It is realistic to assume that there is no free entry in the trading business, mainly 
because of the limited warehouse capacity and restricted credit that is typical in poor 
                                                 
5 This assumption is admittedly not perfectly realistic, as the tax is in reality paid at the port both on imports and 
on exports. The difference with the assumption made above is that in the latter case, the importers have to pay 
taxes even on the goods that might be stolen by the raiders on the way to the inland border. Hence, if  2 x  is the 
value of the imported goods, then the traders would incur an additional expected cost  2 tx π  compared to the 
case prevailing under our simplifying assumption expressed above. We neglect this in what follows, for the sake 
of simplicity.   9
countries. In Africa, long-distance traders usually belong to some long-established family 
networks (see Grégoire and Labazée, 1993). Assuming for the sake of simplicity a quadratic 
cost function, then the representative trader chooses Berbera rather than any other port of the 
Red Sea or the Gulf of Aden area if: 





Et x v π
θ
=− − − ≥ ,        ( 1 )  
where  v is the trader’s reservation profit, which he could expect to earn while using an 
alternative trade route. As will become clearer at (2) below, θ  may be interpreted as an index 
of infrastructural capacity. Then, (1) assumes that the marginal cost of trading is increasing 
with the pressure exerted on this capacity. From the first-order condition, the amount of trade 
going through the country if the weak inequality in (1) holds is: 
  () ( ) 11 xt θ π =−− .          ( 2 )  
  Substituting back into (1), we find that a positive level of trade will go through the 
country if: 
  () ( ) ( )
1/2 1/2 11 2 tv π θ
− −− ≥ .         ( 3 )  
 Assuming  that  2v θ > , (2) and (3) jointly imply that when this is profitable, the level 
of trade will be such that: 
  ()
1/2 2vx θ θ ≤≤.          ( 4 )  
  Otherwise, it will fall to zero. This simple setting thus captures the idea that the 
competitiveness of the port of Berbera depends first on two parameters, namely  and v θ , 
which determine respectively the profitability of doing business with the competitors and the 
physical transport cost inside the country, and then on two choice variables,  and t π , which 
are determined by two key players, respectively the bandits and the tax authority. In what 
follows, we assume that θ  is much larger than 2v , in order to capture the geographical   10
advantage of Berbera over its competitors. Then, Berbera should win, provided the two key 
players manage to put their act together efficiently.  
  The Potential Bandits and the Government 
  Let us first analyze how the potential bandits would behave in a hypothetical society 
where the traditional clanic authorities would fail to organize somehow their activity. We 
make the simplest assumption regarding the cost of raiding the traders, namely that a fraction 
01 γ <<  of the shipment is lost in the raiding. This might capture the collateral damage of 
any fighting between the bandits and the traders that might be involved, or any other form of 
cost that the bandits incur in raiding. This is the simplest assumption, but most results below 
are robust to several extensions. Given this cost function, the representative bandit seeks to 





π π γ =− .          ( 5 )  
  This expression implies that the bandits incur no cost at all if  0 x π = , either because 
there is no traffic to attack, or they have chosen not to perform any raiding. Otherwise, they 
loose a constant fraction of the catch when they raid a trader. When the bandits are not 
organized, they do not take into account the externality that they inflict on other bandits when 
performing an attack, namely that this will in turn damage the reputation of the road and thus 
reduce the level of traffic that can be raided by increasing the expected loss incurred by the 
traders. It is then easy to check that this “roving bandit” equilibrium is characterized in this 
model by the absence of any traffic through the country, as: 
 1  and  0
RR x π == .          ( 6 )  
  Against this background, we can now analyze the first contribution made by the 
assembly of elders in the Somali clanic society in reducing banditry. In this nomadic society, 
where the young men are spread all over the land in search for some fodder for their flock, 
collective identity is not much defined by reference to a territory while genealogy is the key   11
social identifier. Moreover, in this potentially violent society, where herdsmen could fight a 
dispute over grass or water at any time, escalation is prevented by the widespread use of 
“blood compensation”, or diya in the Somali language. This is a clever system for creating 
joint liability within the group of origin of the perpetrator of a violent crime, as the whole 
group is responsible for paying the compensation required by the victim’s group for settling 
the issue. According to Bradbury (2008), the diya for the murder of one man is 100 camels 
(half of this for one woman), which is a very high cost for the group. If the diya is not paid, 
then the aggrieved group is committed to launch a war against the criminal’s one. This 
provides a strong incentive for those involved to exert some control over their fellow clan 
members, so that any young man found guilty of a crime against a member of another clan 
would potentially be punished by his own clan, thereby avoiding inter-clanic violence as far 
as possible. Hence, an important service delivered by the clan is to control the violence that 
could be perpetrated by its own members against either the clan’s members or the members of 
other clans. This gives the elders a key role in the Somali society’s control of violence. This 
power was gradually aggregated in Somaliland during the political build up towards 
democracy by organizing first a large series of local meetings of elders, which then developed 
in a kind of pyramidal fashion, culminating with the creation of the national assembly of the 
elders at the Gurti. This process is well documented by Bradbury (2008). The most striking 
point about this process is that it was mainly organized and funded by the Diaspora of 
Somalilanders who had fled the repression under the Siyad Barre regime. These people played 
a key role in many other parts of Somaliland’s political development and the emergence of 
democracy there. 
  Let us first see what such a consolidation process could deliver within our model 
society with traders and bandits. Quite obviously, such a consolidation process would end up 
creating a kind of syndicated banditry, which could internalize the negative externality   12
involved as an increase in the raiding activity against traders would reduce the size of the 
trade flow itself. Now, instead of problem (5), this coalition would maximize: 
  () ( )( )
, max 1 , s.t. 1 1
S
x Bx x t
π π γθ π =− = − − .    (7)   
  It can be readily checked that this “syndicated banditry” equilibrium yields the 
following levels of raiding and traffic: 
  () 1 2 and  1 2
SS x t πθ == − .       ( 8 )  
  The bottom line of this simple modeling exercise is that the mere fact of forming a 
coalition of clans is not sufficient in general to explain why raiding would stop. Nevertheless, 
the model predicts that the creation of an institution that helps the clanic traditional authorities 
to coordinate their action makes a positive contribution towards efficiency by reducing 
raiding. This institution helps the clans’ leaders to internalize the negative externalities that 
they would inflict on one another by raiding the traders without control, inducing them to 
reduce their raiding activity.  
  Now, absent any political arrangement that could help the government and the 
potential bandits to coordinate their action, the government would simply maximize its 
expected fiscal revenues, taking into account the traders’ best-response function (2) and the 
bandits’ best choice:  
  () ( )( )
, max 1 , s.t. 1 1
tx Gtx xt π θπ =− = − − .       ( 9 )    
  Proposition 1 below describes the resulting Nash equilibrium, which prevails in this 
model when the two players do not coordinate their actions through some political 
arrangement. 
 
Proposition 1: The uncoordinated Nash equilibrium choice of  and t π  by the government 
and the syndicated bandits, respectively, is: 
  12
NN t π ==,         ( 1 0 )    13
entailing a level of traffic: 
  4
N x θ = ,           ( 1 1 )  
and the following payoffs for the bandits and the government, respectively: 
  () 16 and  1 8
NN GB θ γθ == − .        ( 1 2 )  
 
The next section shows how a more inclusive political arrangement can harness this 
social-control mechanism provided by the clanic traditional authorities to improve efficiency 
still further, and reduce raiding to zero. 
 
3. Fiscal Redistribution in the Efficient Political Equilibrium 
  In a clanic society, genealogy is the essence of social identity, as mentioned above. It 
is then natural to assume that the elders have a strong interest in the continuation of the clan, 
and thus care for the welfare of the next generation. This can be captured by using a dynastic 
family model à la Barro (1974). In this kind of models, each generation is affected by inter-
generational altruism, such that the next generation’s welfare is an argument in the current 
generation’s utility function. Choi and Bowles (2007) have coined the expression “parochial 
altruism” to describe such an inter-generational externality, and have shown how these links 
across generations are an important asset for the survival of human groups in a violent 
society, within an evolutionary framework. Hence, the dynastic family assumption seems 
especially appropriate for describing the behavior of a traditional clanic society like the 
Somali one. In this case, it is natural to assume that the players have an infinite horizon, as 
their concern for the next generation creates a chain of inter-generational links up to infinity. 
We thus discuss the political setting in which banditry and warlordism can be eradicated by 
embedding the simple model of the previous section within an infinite-horizon repeated game 
framework. We then show how Somaliland’s political institutions cater for the key 
mechanisms brought out by this model.   14
  The Efficient Political Equilibrium 
  Let  0 <1 and 0< 1
BG δδ <<  denote the bandits’- and the government’s discount 
factors, respectively. Then, assume that the government and the coalition of elders bargain at 
each period over the value of a transfer  0 g >  to be paid by the government if the bandits 
refrain from raiding the traders, i.e., if the elders enforce  0 π = . This implicit contract entails 
that the potential syndicated bandits are acting first and the government second, by delivering 
the transfer after having observed whether the raiding was avoided or not. Moreover, there is 
no third party that can enforce the promise made by the government to deliver the transfer 
once the potential bandits have refrained from raiding the traders. We define an efficient 
political equilibrium as an efficient outcome that can be sustained ad infinitum in the repeated 
game between the government and the potential bandits
6. 
 
Definition 1: An efficient political equilibrium is a triplet { } ,, tg π  that (i) lies on the Pareto 
frontier in the game between the government and the potential syndicated bandits, and (ii) can 
be sustained by a standard trigger-strategy equilibrium. 
 
  In this simple setting involving a transfer, the Pareto-efficient  { } , t π  pair can be 
derived by solving the following problem: 
  () () ( )( )
, max 1 1 , s.t.  1 1
t tx x t
π π πγ θ π −+ − = − − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ .      ( 1 3 )  
  Using standard maximization techniques (Kuhn and Tucker theorem with non-
negativity constraints), one finds that the Pareto-efficient outcome implies the following: 
  *0 , *1 2  a n d   * 2 tx π θ == = .       ( 1 4 )  
  The intuition for this result is pretty straightforward. Because of the unit cost  0 γ > , 
raiding is an inefficient way of collecting revenues from the traders. This entails that the 
                                                 
6 We do not model the precise bargaining process and we thus leave the exact value of the transfer undetermined. 
We focus instead on finding the conditions for the bargaining set not to be empty.   15
government will perform all the tax collection in the efficient equilibrium, knowing that it will 
redistribute part of the resulting revenue as explained below. Moreover, the chosen tax rate is 
the same as in the Nash equilibrium of the previous section, at the level that maximizes the 
Laffer curve, i.e. that maximizes  ( ) 1 tt − . Then, the traffic level is twice as large in this 
equilibrium as in the uncoordinated Nash equilibrium of the previous section.  
  We can now prove the following: 
 






































.         ( 1 7 )  
 
  The proof of proposition 2 is presented in the appendix. The key point that sustains 
this equilibrium is the credibility of the two implicit threats made by the two sides: (i) if the 
government defaults on the transfer, then the bandits will inflict a cost for ever after by 
raiding the traders and reducing the level of traffic that can be taxed. This is credible because 
restraint is costly for them; (ii) if the bandits attack the convoys, then the government will 
withhold the transfer for ever after, including the current period. Because all the parameters 
are assumed to be common knowledge, these threats do not need to be made explicit. Then 
conditions (16) and (17) show the lower bounds for  and 
GB δ δ  that ensure that the range of   16
acceptable values for the transfer g  is not empty. If either one of  and 
GB δ δ , or both of them, 
happened to fall below these lower bounds, then the efficient political equilibrium would not 
exist, because the price to pay the syndicated bandits for security would be deemed too high 
by the government. Notice that the second part of (16) on the right, relating to 
B δ , is trivially 
satisfied if  58 γ ≥ , so that even very short-sighted potential bandits would abide by the 
political agreement if their raiding costs were prohibitively high, provided the government 
kept its word too. 
  Robustness and Relevance 
 
Figure 1: The Acceptable Parameter Set 
 
  Figure 1 helps us to get a more intuitive grasp of this set of conditions. The two 
players’ discount factors 
G δ  and 
B δ  are measured along the two axes, and the downward 
sloping straight line represents the lower bound of (17). The set of { } ,
GB δ δ  pairs that are 
consistent with existence of the efficient political equilibrium is labeled “acceptable triangle”. 
This assumes that  58 γ ≤ , otherwise the set of acceptable parameters is quadrilateral. Notice 
that this acceptable parameters’ set cannot be empty as 
0 lim 2 3 1
G
γ δ
→ = < . 
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  In the case of Somaliland, because of the importance of genealogy as a social identifier 
and of ethnic homogeneity, we expect 
G δ  and 
B δ  to be very close to one another and pretty 
high. However, it is interesting to notice in the more general case that even a fairly short-
sighted government, with a low 
G δ , would abide by the political agreement if γ  was high 
enough and 
B δ  was close enough to 1. This emphasizes the importance of the government’s 
relative efficiency at collecting resources from the traders compared to raiding by the bandits, 
because it determines the level of transfer required to buy security. Inefficient bandits are 
cheaper to buy off than efficient ones.  The two sides need to be closer in terms of { } ,
GB δ δ , 
the further away is 
B δ  from 1, as long as  ( ) ( ) 18 3 3 2
B δ γγ ≥− − , and the lower is γ . The 
opposite case holds too, where a very long-sighted government, e.g., a hereditary monarchy, 
could sustain the efficient political equilibrium even if the potential bandits had a very low 
B δ , e.g., because of a high mortality rate, provided γ  was high enough.  
  The foregoing modeling exercise thus suggests that the conditions bearing on the 
parameters for the efficient political equilibrium to exist are not too restrictive. Then, this 
model sheds some light on the political institutions that have been put in place in Somaliland. 
The key problem to be solved was for the business-oriented elite to delegate to the traditional 
authorities the task of controlling violence and banditry effectively so that Berbera became an 
attractive outlet for the traders from Ethiopia as well as for exporting the output of the 
livestock sector. The first step was to help the clans’ elders to cooperate by organizing several 
local conferences. But the model shows that this is not enough to provide the incentives for 
reducing banditry to zero. The second step was aimed at making credible the promise of 
transferring a share of the enhanced fiscal resources resulting from the increased trade flow to 
the clans. A bicameral system was put in place to ensure that the elders had a key role in the 
law-making process, by giving them a direct access to the required information, as well as   18
some veto power in the implicit bargaining problem. As seen above in the introductory 
section, the redistribution of the fiscal resources was focused on the development of the 
education and health sectors in all the regions, as one would expect in a country where 
genealogy is the key social identifier that determines each person’s affiliation to a clan. The 
dynastic family model thus seems to apply perfectly in this case, and explains why people felt 
compensated for their efforts by seeing their children getting some medical protection and 
going to school and to university. 
 
4. Why Not the Rest of Somalia? 
  The foregoing modeling exercise begs the question of why such an efficient political 
equilibrium did not emerge in the rest of Somalia. One answer is given by Eubank (2010), 
who claims that foreign aid played a detrimental role there, by relaxing the need to build 
accountable institutions in that part of the country. Within the above model’s framework, this 
was yielding a good substitute for fiscal revenues that was not dependent on the elders’ 
provision of security. Another easy culprit is the interference of foreign powers, including 
Ethiopia and the US behind it, emphasized by Lewis (2008). There is some merit in these two 
diagnoses, but it is worth going into more detail to look at the missed opportunities in eastern 
and southern Somalia.  
The first point to notice is that without declaring secession formally, the northeastern 
part of Somalia built up also a bottom-up institutional solution as the “New Puntland State of 
Somalia”, which was founded at a conference in Garowe in 1998. This promising solution 
started among some Darod clans, and in particular among the Mijerteyn (Lewis, 2008), but it 
was missing two of the key ingredients of Somaliland’s success. First of all, that part of the 
country did not inherit an infrastructural asset of the same caliber as the port of Berbera and 
really had very little infrastructure instead. In fact, the Puntland ruling elite never lost sight of 
the nearby formal capital-city in Mogadishu in the south. That’s where the infrastructural   19
assets are located, mostly built there during the colonial period, despite the massive 
destruction brought about by the war. Mogadishu has two ports, the new and the old one, and 
an international airport. Moreover a road to Addis Abbeba has been built, called the “Strada 
Imperiale”, which could be restored. Hence, the Puntlanders never severed their links to the 
rest of Somalia, realizing probably that they would never be in a position to levy the fiscal 
resources required to cement a Puntlander social contract similar to the one prevailing in 
Somaliland. Their strategy was clearly leaning in the opposite direction, suggesting that they 
were just regarding the “New Puntland State” as a mere building block to reconstruct 
Somalia. Second, they did not build any institutional representation of the elders, as they 
created a mono-cameral parliament, which did not have much resource to go round anyway. 
In the terms of the previous section’s model, this might be blamed on the lack of significant 
transport infrastructures, and thus on the lower need for security. This is illustrated by the fact 
that piracy is quite active off the coast of Puntland, imposing some negative externality on all 
the ports of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. However, the failure to give the elders a large 
enough role in the New State of Puntland is also probably due to the towering figure of Col. 
Abdillahi Yusuf, who assumed first the Presidency in Puntland, up to 2001, and then won the 
Federal Presidency in Mogadishu, which is in fact an empty shell. According to Lewis (2008), 
he was to a large extent the puppet of the Ethiopian government. Col. Abdillahi Yusuf 
obviously failed to draw the lessons of the failure of the military regime imposed by Siyad 
Barre before the breakup to create top-down a viable state in Somalia, as he tried also to 
impose his authoritarian rule on the New State of Puntland. However, imposing the “rule of 
fear” also requires resources, which are dramatically lacking in Puntland, while they are 
somewhat higher in Mogadishu, if only because of foreign aid as mentioned above.  
  Southern Somalia once had the resources to support the strong authoritarian 
government led by Siyad Barre, who had a very destructive strategy regarding the traditional   20
clan system. For a while, his government was aligned with the Soviet Union, which was 
playing a complicated game in the Horn of Africa. Then, alliances switched, and the USA 
became involved. Although southern Somalia inherited a valuable infrastructural asset at 
independence, in addition to the sovereignty rent due to international recognition and foreign 
aid, it was facing a more complicated political problem than Somaliland. While the latter is 
very homogenous, with most of its population involved in nomadic pastoral activity, the 
former has a sizable agricultural area, between the Shabelle and Jubba rivers. The Somali 
clans living there have a distinct sedentary culture, in which territory matters at least as much 
as genealogy, so that the elders have a weakened role in social control relative to the other 
two regions. Moreover, there are some Bantu farmers in the midst of this Somali population, 
loosening further the ethnic ties in that part of Somalia. They first came there as slaves but are 
nowadays mainly acting as independent farmers. Hence, the traditional authorities are too 
weak in that part of Somalia for delivering the kind of social-control services available in 
Somaliland, on the one hand, while the government was too authoritarian to make credible 
promises of redistribution, for lack of checks and balances, on the other hand. Moreover, the 
sovereignty rent provided by foreign aid was making the need for a cooperative solution less 
pressing and the latter has never been tried, as Syad Barre sought to impose his rule by fear. 
A temporary solution emerged recently in that land dominated by the warlords when 
the Islamic Courts took over. As emphasized in particular by Roberts (2003), the main reason 
why political Islam is enjoying so much popular support in Muslim countries is that it 
promises to impose an equal rule of law for all via the Sharia law, in stark contrast to 
Somalia’s domination by warlords and bandits. These Islamic courts managed to take over in 
Mogadishu, ousting the warlords from the city and its infrastructures, and starting to restore 
the port and the airport. Unfortunately, some geo-strategic considerations did not allow this 
solution to endure. The US government and its Ethiopian allies feared that these Islamic   21
courts had links with Al Qaeda, and helped some warlords to regain control of the city with 
the support of the Ethiopian army (Lewis, 2008). The Islamic peace then broke down, and 
hundreds of civilians fled the city again, as the latter was returning to its previous state of 
chaos. Whether this is just one example of the counter-productive effects of external 
interference in Southern Somalia is debatable. According to Lewis (2008), the link with Al 
Qaeda has been more an excuse for reinstating a puppet warlord controlled by the Ethiopians 
than a proven fact. However, it is often difficult to define precisely what a “link with Al-
Qaeda” really is, as the latter has a very loose kind of organizational structure. According to 
Orbach (2001), Al-Qaeda is just an “umbrella framework of groups” (Orbach, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the lethal attacks perpetrated in June and July 2010 in Somaliland and in 
Uganda by the Al Shabaab group, which then controlled most of central and southern 
Somalia, undoubtedly seem inspired by Al Qaeda’s style
7. Moreover, the emergence of such a 
radical Islamist group might be a response to chaos, as no such thing happened in 
democratizing Somaliland. This suggests that reverse causation is probably at work here. 
According to Bradbury (2008) and Lewis (2008), the most shocking manifestation of 
dysfunctional external interference is provided by the endless series of recurrent UN-
sponsored peace conferences, where the wrong people are repeatedly invited. According to 
Bradbury (2008) the UN keeps inviting people who have irreversibly destroyed their 
reputation by collaborating with the pre-civil war dictatorship, and who are not in a position 
to deliver the kind of services that the clans’ elders do provide in Somaliland. He claims that 
these people seem only to be anybody’s “representatives” in the UN’s imagination, while they 
are completely cut off from the true social fabric of the Somali society. Nevertheless, this 
seems to have created a constituency in favor of the recurrent conferences, which would loose 
a lot if the war was to end because of the perks they get for attending them. Bradbury (2008) 
                                                 
7 Armstrong, Paul. 2010. “Somali militants ready to terrorize world ?”www.CNN.com, July 13, 2010 (accessed 
the next day).    22
suggests that these conferences are a Eurocentric toy that is only meant to further some UN 
officers’ careers, without any hope of solving any problems in Somalia. He calls them 
“farcical”, as does Lewis (2008). Probably, the best response to this line of criticism would be 
to screen participants in these conferences according to the social-control services that they 
can deliver effectively, along the lines suggested by the experience of Somaliland. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  The case study performed above of the emerging “Somaliland Republic”, which is as 
yet unrecognized internationally, provides a natural experiment that sheds some useful light 
on the theory of state building. It brings out that the Hobbesian Leviathan is not the only path 
available for controlling violence and building up a peaceful state. It suggests that a Lockean 
“horizontal social contract” model may be a viable solution in some circumstances, for 
“breaking up” a state of anarchy, using the expression coined by Hirshleifer (1995). In 
Somaliland, we observe a separation of the power to control violence, which belongs to the 
clans’ elders, on the one hand, and the power to tax and to produce some of the public goods 
that a modern state is expected to provide, on the other hand. Among other things, this study 
thus shows the benefit that political economists can get from using the work of the social 
anthropologists for understanding the political economy of developing countries. In return, 
our modeling exercise demonstrates the key part played by an inherited infrastructural asset, 
namely the port of Berbera and the road that links it to Ethiopia.  
This model may thus be viewed as an extension of Hart’s “Property Rights Approach” 
to the theory of the firm (Hart, 1995). The clanic authorities can invest in providing security, 
an asset that enters the production function for transport services as a complement to 
infrastructure. This insight is fundamental for understanding why a bicameral democratic 
institution lies at the heart of Somaliland’s political institutions, for providing a balanced 
representation of the traditional authorities and of the business-oriented modern actors. Hence,   23
Somaliland’s experience provides a fruitful line of arguments in favor of a qualified support 
for the traditional “project aid” doctrine, with its emphasis on funding infrastructural projects, 
which has inspired the action of the World Bank and other development agencies for decades. 
The qualification brought out by this case study is that a correct political setting is required, 
aimed at making the redistribution of the benefits from cooperation among the different actors 
credible. This redistribution is the compensation due to the potential bandits for refraining 
from raiding the traders and thus participating in the efficient political equilibrium. By 
contrast, the rest of Somalia seems stuck in an endless series of UN-sponsored “farcical peace 
conferences”, as dubbed by Bradbury (2008) and Lewis (2008). This suggests that the 
inability to set up a correct political system, partly because of external interference but more 
fundamentally because of unfavorable initial conditions, is making the infrastructural assets of 
southern Somalia pretty useless for producing the peace. These include Mogadishu’s old and 
new ports and its airport, the “Strada Imperiale” road that links them to Addis Abbeba. 
Similarly, the rent to sovereignty provided by access to foreign aid that comes with 
international recognition is not necessarily contributing much to that end at present.  
The state-formation theory presented in this paper is well suited for explaining other 
cases of political settlements elsewhere in Africa. For example, the role of some transport 
infrastructure in sustaining a peace process is evident in the cases of Southern Chad and 
Southern Sudan (Azam and Djimtoingar, 2008, Jok, 2007). There the key infrastructure has 
been the pipeline that brings the oil extracted in the south to the Red Sea and the world market 
via Port Sudan in the north, in the Sudanese case, and to the Cameroonian border, in the 
Chadian one. For centuries, the northerners have been raiding the south for capturing slaves in 
these two countries, and civil war prevailed for decades between these two groups after 
independence (Azevedo, 1998, Burr and Collins, 2008). Then, alliances switched as oil was 
found in the south and became the key asset they had in the 1990s. In Chad, the northerner   24
Idriss Déby who emerged as the ruler from decades of civil war created an informal power-
sharing agreement by giving a lot of power to the former leader of the rebellion in the south, 
Gen. Kamougué, including the ability to fight back in case of cheating, by keeping some units 
of the rebel army intact within the national army. A more obvious signaling effort was 
required in Sudan, as the Northerners only sought for peace after the Southerners had blown 
up the pipeline. Nevertheless, a similar power-sharing agreement was established soon after 
the required collaboration for keeping the oil flowing was thus made obvious.  The downside 
of this mechanism is that the new political equilibrium excludes the ethnic groups whose 
territory is too remote from the pipelines to exert any credible threat. This is why the Tubu in 
northern Chad are completely marginalized and repressed by the army, while the Sudanese 
government is violently cutting off its ties with its former allies from Darfur (Prunier, 2007). 
These dramatic examples illustrate vividly how transport infrastructures play a key role in 
determining the politically-sustainable boundaries of the states when their efficiency depends 
on the goodwill of the people living around them. 
  
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2: Assume that both players adopt the standard trigger 
strategy (see e.g., Gibbons, 1992). If they choose to cooperate and refrain from raiding the 
traders in the hope of getting a transfer from the government g , the potential syndicated 










.             ( 1 8 )  
If they choose instead to deviate and attack the traders, the syndicated bandits will be 
punished first within the same period, as the government withholds the transfer g , and the 
static Nash equilibrium outcome will then prevail ever after. Assuming that this deviation is 
not expected by the traders, this yields the following present value:   25












.         ( 1 9 )  
  The potential syndicated bandits will thus choose to refrain from raiding the traders if 












.         ( 2 0 )  
  On its part, if the government chooses to cooperate, i.e., to deliver the agreed amount 














.          ( 2 1 )  
If it chooses instead to deviate, and to withdraw its transfer in spite of the potential 
bandits’ compliance with the promised  0 π = , then the government will first keep the whole 
fiscal revenue in the current period, and then get its Nash-equilibrium payoff 
N G  from then 
on. This yields the following present value: 
 








.        ( 2 2 )  
  Then, the government will choose to cooperate if 







≤ .           ( 2 3 )  
  Hence, (20) and (23) give us the range of values of the transfer g  that can sustain the 
efficient political equilibrium, as shown in (15). Then, conditions (16) and (17) are required to 
ensure that this range is not empty.  
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